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Abstract 
Notwithstanding the fact that valuing personality descriptors from the realm of character were 
deliberately excluded from the Big Five model of personality, in the study of economic 
games (EGs; e.g., the prisoner’s dilemma) the Big Five were used when predicting outcomes 
in the field of behaviors that are socially valued in terms of fairness and altruism (i.e., the 
moral domain). Eventually evaluative traits were introduced and found useful in the study of 
EGs, namely the HEXACO dimension honesty/humility (H/H). As an extensive list of 
evaluative traits, the Values In Action classification of character strengths may complement 
H/H when assessing character and predicting individuals’ decisions in EGs. For this study, N 
= 155 participants completed the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths, a measure of the 
HEXACO traits, and four different EGs that involved decisions relevant to fairness and 
altruism. Along with H/H, individuals’ positions on a dimension abstracting heart-related vs. 
mind-related character strengths predicted outcomes in the EGs. These results support earlier 
findings that evaluative traits predict decisions relevant to fairness and altruism. Furthermore, 
character strengths can be seen as complementing H/H when predicting behavior in the moral 
domain by character.  
Keywords: Altruism, Character strengths, Economic games, Fairness, 
Honesty/humility, Moral domain, Personality  
!  
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The role of character traits in economic games 
1. Introduction 
Players tend to make fair and altruistic decisions in economic games like the prisoner’s 
dilemma or the dictator game. This contradicts the notion of the homo oeconomicus, which 
posits that individuals’ dominant interest is to rationally maximize their own economic 
benefit. It was demonstrated that deviations from strictly rational decisions are predicted by 
individuals’ expressions of personality traits. Big Five personality traits such as neuroticism 
and foremost agreeableness were demonstrated to explain interindividual variance in 
economic game outcomes. While for example neuroticism is assumed to go along with a 
reduced tendency to take risks in the prisoner’s dilemma (cf. Lönnqvist, Verkasalo, & 
Walkowitz, 2011), Big Five agreeableness is assumed to be linked to decisions in economic 
games due to high scorers’ higher (vs. low scorers’ lower) motivation to promote positive 
interpersonal relationships (see Zhao & Smillie, 2015, for an overview). While the role of the 
Big Five personality traits in economic games is well investigated, the introduction of 
honesty/humility (H/H) in the study of economic games was an important step toward 
predicting behavior in the moral domain by resorting to theoretically more relevant 
evaluative personality traits1. The term “moral domain” as used here is supposed to denote 
the field of behaviors that are socially esteemed in terms of virtue, goodness, and integrity, 
such as fairness and altruism. As a dimension of the HEXACO model of personality (cf. 
Ashton & Lee, 2001) H/H can be seen as more closely and directly related to the concepts of 
fairness and altruism that play a role in individuals’ decision in economic games (cf. 
Baumert, Schlösser, & Schmitt, 2014). Across different economic games, H/H was found to 
be a predictor of players’ decisions (e.g., Hilbig, Thielmann, Hepp, Klein, & Zettler, 2015; 
Hilbig, Zettler, Leist, & Heydasch, 2013). The inclusion of H/H in the HEXACO model of 
personality (Ashton & Lee, 2001) was a great leap forward toward incorporating evaluative 
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aspects in personality research. In the HEXACO model, five factors were found largely 
resembling the Big Five dimensions, while H/H emerged as an additional dimension 
abstracting the covariance between evaluative descriptors with the facets sincerity, fairness, 
greed-avoidance, and modesty (cf. Ashton & Lee, 2009). H/H can be seen as covering some 
of the very aspects of personality that were defined as character in terms of “personality 
evaluated” and distinguished from personality as temperament by early personality 
researchers (cf. Allport, 1921).  
However, next to H/H there is a comprehensive list of evaluative traits that can help to 
add to and complement H/H when describing and classifying character, also in order to 
predict decisions in economic games and the moral domain in general. Peterson and Seligman 
(2004) proposed the VIA (Values in Action) classification of character strengths as positive 
traits that constitute the “good character”. Character strengths are defined as ubiquitous, 
fulfilling, morally valued, trait-like, distinct and measurable individual differences (Peterson 
& Seligman, 2004). There are 24 character strengths that relate to six core virtues which are 
esteemed across cultures and historical epochs. The virtues and the related character strengths 
are: (1) wisdom and knowledge (includes the character strengths creativity, curiosity, open-
mindedness, love of learning, perspective), (2) courage (i.e., bravery, perseverance, honesty, 
zest), (3) humanity (i.e., capacity to love and be loved [short: love], kindness, social 
intelligence), (4) justice (i.e., teamwork, fairness, leadership), (5) temperance (i.e., 
forgiveness, modesty, prudence, self-regulation), and (6) transcendence (i.e., appreciation of 
beauty and excellence, gratitude, hope, humor, spirituality). A more detailed summary of the 
VIA classification is given by Ruch et al. (2010). Character strengths, as assessed with the 
established Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS; Peterson, Park, & Seligman, 
2005), were demonstrated to be stable across measurement points in terms of medium to high 
test-retest correlations in 3 to 9 months’ intervals (e.g., Ruch et al., 2010).  
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To attain an aggregated measure of two central aspects of the VIA-IS character 
strengths, an established can be used: Peterson (2006) suggested a two-dimensional factor 
space that consistently results from a principal component analysis of ipsatized scores of the 
character strengths. This approach classifies the entire character strengths on two axes: one 
bipolar dimension abstracts the covariance of “strengths of the mind (e.g., prudence, open-
mindedness) vs. strengths of the heart (e.g., zest, love)”. The other bipolar dimension 
abstracts the covariance of character strengths relating to the self (e.g., creativity, love of 
learning) vs. strengths relating to others (e.g., teamwork, forgiveness). This ipsative approach 
was preferred over a normative one as in the economic games require decisions during which 
different strengths might be in conflict (e.g., kindness vs. open-mindedness). Hence, the 
decisions might be based on the relative rather than the absolute expression of the strengths. 
The aim of the present paper is to test whether interindividual variance in economic 
game outcomes can be explained by individuals’ expression of traits from the realm of 
evaluative personality description (i.e., H/H and character strengths). Like in earlier studies 
on the role of H/H in economic games (e.g., Hilbig et al., 2013, 2015), high expressions of 
H/H are assumed to go along with fairer and more altruistic decisions than low expressions of 
H/H. Furthermore it is expected that individuals’ location on two factorial dimensions of the 
VIA-IS predict decisions in economic games: as factor scores increase toward the “strengths 
of the heart” pole (e.g., zest, love) of the first dimension and to the “relating to others” pole 
(e.g., teamwork, forgiveness) of the second dimension, individuals are assumed to make 
fairer and more altruistic decisions. Accordingly, as a secondary objective of the present 
study, it was aimed at exploring whether character can be useful to gain a more detailed 
picture on who is inclined toward making fair and altruistic decisions (i.e., locating decision 
tendencies in economic games in the space spanned by two character trait dimensions 
representing the trade-offs between emotional vs. rational motives on the one hand and self-
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directed vs. other-directed motives on the other hand). To control for the effect of non-
evaluative traits, all HEXACO dimensions other than H/H will be included when predicting 
the decisions in the economic games from H/H and the character strengths factors. As the 
VIA character strengths are reasoned to cover a broader spectrum of evaluative traits than 
H/H, they are expected to explain incremental variance in the economic game decisions 
beyond H/H.  
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited via university mailing lists, psychology magazine websites, social 
platforms, and leaflets. In the advertisement, participants were offered a personal feedback on 
their individual expressions of character strengths and HEXACO personality traits. The 
sample included N = 155 participants (33 males, age: M = 24.95 years, SD = 7.61). The 
majority of the participants were Swiss (75.5%) or German (20.0%). More than half (55.5%) 
were currently students at a university or a university of applied sciences, 26.5% held a 
diploma allowing them to attend a university or a university of applied sciences, 14.2% 
completed a degree at a university or university of applied sciences, 1.9% completed 
vocational training, and 1.9% completed secondary education.  
2.2 Instruments 
The Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS; Peterson et al., 2005; German 
adaptation by Ruch et al., 2010) is a 240-item questionnaire for the assessment of the 24 
character strengths (10 items per strengths) covered by the VIA classification (Peterson and 
Seligman, 2004). It uses a 5-point Likert-style scale ranging from 1 (“very much unlike me”) 
to 5 (“very much like me”). A sample item is “In a group, I try to make sure everyone feels 
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included.” (leadership). Several studies demonstrated the good psychometric properties of the 
German version of the VIA-IS (e.g., Proyer, Gander, Wellenzohn, & Ruch, 2015). Internal 
consistencies in the present sample ranged from α = .70 (teamwork) to .89 (creativity and 
spirituality) with a median of .76.  
The HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2009) is a 60-item questionnaire for the assessment 
of the six dimensions of the HEXACO model of personality (10 items per dimension) 
employing a 5-point Likert-style scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly 
agree”). The six dimensions are: H/H (e.g., “I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion 
at work, even if I thought it would succeed.”), emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, 
conscientiousness, and openness to experience. Internal consistencies in the present sample 
ranged from α = .69 (agreeableness) to .83 (extraversion). 
2.2.1 Economic games 
On the basis of their payoff-rules, different economic games can be allocated loosely 
to one of two categories (cf. Zhao & Smillie, 2015). Firstly, there are social dilemmas 
(characterized by a trade-off between more directly available attainment of outcomes relevant 
to the self-interest on the one hand and less securely available outcomes relevant to the 
collective interests on the other hand). Typically, individuals have the opportunity to choose 
either a “selfish” outcome that is a safe bet or a cooperative option that involves a leap of 
faith when taking a chance that the game partners might not simultaneously cooperate. That 
is, mutual cooperation leads to better overall outcomes while featuring a personal reward that 
is dependent from the other players’ decisions (e.g., the prisoner’s dilemma; cf. Dawes, 
1980). The selfish outcome is typically designed as smaller but more warranted than the 
cooperative collective outcome that would result from all players expecting and performing 
mutual cooperation. As a second category, there are bargaining games, in which the players 
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can allocate a share of a given amount of goods (e.g., money) to their game partners in a one-
way allocation. Typically, in this category the payoff does not depend on the game partners’ 
simultaneous contributions, although players may have the chance to refuse an offer in 
special variants (i.e., the ultimatum bargaining game) or may reciprocate or retaliate against 
previous offers when taking turns with a game partner in iterative rounds of games. Despite 
this distinction between two categories of economic games, a common denominator can be 
found by categorizing both types as involving conflicts between the interest of the self and 
concerns for others (so called mixed-motive situations, see Haesevoets, Folmer, & Van Hiel, 
2015). Accordingly, as a common feature, economic games involve decisions that are 
relevant to fairness and altruism (cf. Baumert et al., 2014; Zhao & Smillie, 2015). In the 
economic games used in the present study, participants were instructed that they had been 
assigned to an anonymous game partner via a computer-assisted network that would be also 
keeping track of all game outcomes. If not otherwise specified, participants entered their offer 
by typing digits into a response field. To reduce the potential effect of different financial 
situations (i.e., income and savings), the games used play money (Talers), following the 
procedure suggested by Lönnqvist et al. (2011).  
 Prisoner’s dilemma (adaptation by Lönnqvist et al., 2011). Participants‘ were to 
allocate zero up to ten Talers to their alleged game partner who would be asked to make the 
same decision as the participant. It was explained that participants’ total outcome would 
depend both on their own decision and on their game partner’s decisions. They were 
informed that the experimenter would double the allocated amount, so the best collective 
outcome would be if both allocated all their money. However, retaining one’s own money 
and hoping for the game partner to allocate his or her money would have maximized the 
personal benefit. Participants entered their offer moving a slider bar with eleven steps 
(labeled “0” to “10”).  
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Dictator Game (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). Participants decided how 
many of a total of 100 Talers they wanted to allocate to their anonymous game partner. They 
were informed that they could keep as much as they wished.  
Ultimatum Bargaining Game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). Participants 
decided how many of a total of 100 Talers they wanted to allocate to their anonymous game 
partner. They were instructed that the anonymous game partner would have the chance to 
refuse the share offer. Participants were informed that in this case they would lose their share.  
Public Goods Game (cf. Kollock, 1998). Participants were instructed that they were 
playing with three game partners and they could anonymously contribute 0 up to 10 Talers to 
a shared account. The shared account would be doubled and equally distributed among the 
four game partners irrespective of their individual contribution. The best collective outcome 
would be attained if all four players allocated all their money. However, retaining one‘s own 
money and hoping for the game partners to allocate all their money would maximize the 
personal benefit when the money in the shared account is paid out. 
2.3 Procedure 
To avoid priming effects, the study was conducted in two sessions. In Session 1, participants 
answered the VIA-IS and the HEXACO-60 online. After one week they were invited to 
Session 2 via E-Mail and indicated their choices in the economic games online. The order of 
the economic games was randomized. As incentivized conditions were previously 
demonstrated to make associations between Big Five personality traits and outcomes of 
economic games become more evident (Lönnqvist et al., 2011), participants were given a 
real-world incentive to maximize the personal outcome. More specifically, participants were 
instructed that the more Talers they had at the end of the study the higher their chances would 
be to win one of ten online shopping vouchers amounting to 20 Swiss Franks in a prize draw. 
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At the end of Session 2, participants were debriefed and informed that all participants had the 
same chances to win a prize.  
3. Data preparation 
The VIA-IS factor scores for the “strengths of the mind vs. strengths of the heart” and 
the “strengths relating to the self vs. strengths relating to others” dimension were derived by 
first ipsatizing the 24 scales (i.e., by subtracting the mean of all strengths from each single 
strength scale and dividing this difference by the individual standard deviation for each 
participant). Then, a principal component analysis was conducted on the intercorrelation of 
the ipsatized scales. Like in previous studies (e.g., Proyer et al., 2015; Ruch et al., 2010), two 
factors were extracted and obliquely rotated.  
To obtain an aggregated measure of decision-making tendencies in economic games, 
in a first step the two game outcomes that ranged from 0 to 10 (Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Public Goods Game) were multiplied by 10, so that the score can be interpreted as a 
percentage of the maximum amount. In a second step, an aggregated game score averaging 
the outcomes of the four games was generated. Higher (vs. lower) scores indicate decisions 
that are more in favor of the game partner or the common good. The four economic games as 
indicators for fair and altruistic tendencies yielded satisfactory convergence (mean r = .29; 
Cronbach’s alpha = .60) and the mean aggregated game score was 46.94 (SD = 17.74, 
ranging from 0.00 to 87.50). 
4. Results 
The zero-order correlations between the aggregated game score and the other variables are 
given in Table 1. As Table 1 shows, the aggregated game score correlated with gender, H/H, 
the “strengths of the mind vs. heart” dimension of the VIA-IS.  
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Insert Table 1 about here 
To analyze if H/H was a predictor of the economic game outcomes over and above the 
remaining five HEXACO traits (as a proxy for the Big Five) and to test whether the two 
dimensions of the VIA-IS had an incremental effect beyond all other predictors, a multiple 
regression analysis was conducted. Different predictors were entered in four consecutive 
steps in order to arrive at a hierarchical prediction of the economic game score as the 
criterion. That is, the respective predictor (or set of predictors) being looked at in one step of 
the analysis was added to the model on top of the predictors included in the previous step at 
any one time (naturally, except for Step 1). For example, the influences of H/H, the “Big 
Five” HEXACO traits, age, and gender were determined after the influences of the “Big 
Five” HEXACO traits, age, and gender were tested. Subsequently, the predictive value of the 
character strengths dimensions was jointly tested with all other predictors. This approach was 
preferred over the test of predictors in one single step in order to gain knowledge about the 
predictive power of the single (sets of) predictors in terms of an increment in the dependent 
variance explained by the model. The results are given in Table 2.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
As Table 2 shows, gender predicted the game score significantly in Step 1: women allocated 
more money to their game partners than men (overall model in Step 1: F[3, 152] = 3.38, p = 
.037). In Step 2, the “Big Five” (i.e., the HEXACO dimension except for H/H) did not predict 
the game score significantly (overall model in Step 2: F[7, 147] = 1.30, p = .256). With H/H 
entered in Step 3, H/H emerged as a significant predictor and the overall model was 
significant (F[8, 146] = 2.32, p = .023). In the final model (Step 4), F(10, 144) = 2.54, p = 
.008, the “strengths of the mind vs. strengths of the heart” dimension predicted the game 
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score significantly beyond the influence of the HEXACO traits, of which again H/H but also 
extraversion (with a negative weight) were significant predictors. The final model including 
all predictors explained 9% (adjusted R2) of the variance in the game score. 
5. Discussion 
As expected and line with previous findings, participants high in H/H tended to allocate a 
greater amount of their game money to their game partners compared to participants low in 
H/H. The findings on extraversion have to be interpreted with strong reservation, as the 
influence of this variable is likely to be explained by a suppressor effect, as extraversion did 
not correlate with the game score on the bivariate level. Furthermore, as expected, 
participants scoring closer to the “heart” pole of the “strengths of the mind vs. strengths of 
the heart” dimension (as indicated by higher factor scores) allocated a greater amount of their 
game money to their game partners compared to participants scoring closer to the “mind” 
pole of this dimension (as indicated by lower factor scores). As indicated by a significant 
increment in the variance explained, character strengths can be seen as predicting the game 
score above and beyond the effect of H/H. This suggests that beyond sincerity, fairness, 
greed-avoidance, and modesty (i.e., the facets of H/H) the VIA classification can help to 
describe, classify, and assess character in a more exhaustive fashion.  
Contrary to expectations, the dimension “strengths relating to the self vs. strengths 
relating to others” did not explain variance in the game outcomes significantly. It seems that 
the “mind vs. heart” dimension abstracted all the covariance among the character strengths 
that is relevant to decisions in economic games. Hence, it can be suggested that rather than 
driven by a trade-off between the focus on the self and the focus on others, fair and altruistic 
acts can be explained by decisions that are “rational vs. affectionate” with “heart-spirited” 
individuals allocating more money to their game partners than “mind-driven” individuals in 
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the economic games. Hence, as we also aimed at defining the usefulness of character in the 
moral domain by developing a more detailed picture on who is inclined toward making fair 
and altruistic decisions, we may suggest that economic games!and maybe also moral 
decisions in general!are a matter of compassionate emotional involvement rather than 
merely a mixed-motive situation characterized by a conflict of the interest of the self vs. 
concerns for others (cf. Haesevoets et al., 2015). 
The results suggest that as a comprehensive collection of evaluative traits the VIA 
classification of character strengths is worth considering when explaining variance in players’ 
decisions in economic games operationalizing fairness and altruism––along with (and maybe 
even beyond) a second established conceptualization of character, i.e., HEXACO H/H. While 
H/H was developed using a lexical approach, the VIA classification was deducted from 
various sources dealing with virtue and the “good character” (such as boy scout statutes or 
philosophers’ writings) and hence almost naturally covers a broader spectrum of evaluative 
traits.  
Considering earlier findings on the role of the Big Five in economic games, it is may 
seem surprising that the “Big Five” traits as entailed in the HEXACO (i.e., the “EXACO”) 
did not have any predictive value for the game score, apart from the effect of extraversion 
(which may be based on a suppressor effect). However, this result is consistent with previous 
findings indicating no significant correlations between the “EXACO” and the allocations in a 
one-shot dictator game whereas some of the traditional Big Five measures were correlated 
significantly (Hilbig et al., 2015). There are at least two possible explanations for this. Firstly, 
the “EXACO” dimensions do not exactly replicate the traditional Big Five. Because of 
extracting an additional factor, in the HEXACO model the aspects relevant for decisions in 
economic games may be moved off from the five factors corresponding to the Big Five and 
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attached to H/H. Secondly, the role of the “EXACO” traits in economic games may be 
underestimated when looking only at one-shot paradigms rather than iterative games. For 
example, agreeableness as entailed in the HEXACO model may come into play only after an 
individual did not encounter reciprocity in previous rounds with highly agreeable individuals 
tending to indulge being exploited. In support of this assumption, previous findings indicate 
that agreeableness (as entailed in the HEXACO model) is linked to not retaliating in the 
ultimatum bargaining game in terms of a “reactive” cooperation (Hilbig et al., 2013).  
The present study may be limited by the relatively small sample, which included more 
female than male participants. Even though we statistically controlled for the effects of 
gender, it would be desirable for future studies to include a gender-balanced sample that also 
allows for a more systematic investigation of gender differences. Another limitation of the 
present study might be that, similar to previous studies (e.g., Hilbig et al., 2015), a relatively 
short (60-item) measure of the HEXACO traits was used. Most likely, the full version 
captures more aspects of the facets relevant for predicting behavior in economic games than 
the short version. Hence, H/H might explain even more variance in economic games than the 
present findings indicate. In other words, the incremental variance explained by the VIA-IS 
might be somewhat overestimated. However, if the given assumption holds true, it is also 
possible that the joint predictive power of all evaluative traits measured (i.e., H/H and 
character strengths) is underestimated in this study. 
5.1 Conclusions 
The present findings indicate that evaluative traits (i.e., H/H and character strengths) 
as aspects of character are useful when predicting decisions in the moral domain. The VIA 
classification complements personality description in the evaluative spectrum and!in the 
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light of the present finding!can be seen as adding to the H/H dimension when accounting 
for behavior that is socially esteemed in terms of virtue, goodness, and integrity. 
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Footnotes 
1 Evaluative trait descriptors were deliberately excluded from the item pools analyzed 
in the course of the development of the Big Five model (cf. Almagor, Tellegen, & Waller, 
1995). Studies using more inclusive and lexically more representative item samples support 
the notion that, beyond the Big Five, additional dimensions exist that abstract socially valued 
aspects of personality in terms of personality evaluated according to prevailing standards of 
conduct (cf. Allport, 1921; i.e., Ashton & Lee, 2001: H/H; Almagor et al., 1995: positive 
valence and negative valence; De Raad & Barelds, 2008: virtue, competence, and hedonism). 
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Table 1 
Correlations Between the Economic Game Score, Age, Gender, HEXACO Traits, and Character Strengths Factors 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) Economic Game Score  .01 .21* .25* .00 -.01 .05 -.06 -.03 .17* .11 
(2) Age   -.02 .20* -.06 .03 .12 .00 .15 -.07 .01 
(3) Gender    .22* .27* .17* .06 .09 -.08 .27* .29* 
(4) Honesty-Humility    -.04 .27* .34* .11 -.05 .13 .28* 
(5) Emotionality     -.23* -.08 .14 -.22* -.05 .51* 
(6) Extraversion      .13 -.05 .02 .66* -.05 
(7) Agreeableness        .01 -.01 .01 .36* 
(8) Conscientiousness        -.10 -.26* .04 
(9) Openness         -.04 -.43* 
(10) Strengths of the mind vs. heart           .06 
(11) Strengths related to the self vs. others           
Note. N = 155. Gender: 0 = male, 1 = female. 
* p < .05 (two-tailed).
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Table 2 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting the Total Score Across Four Economic Games  
 B SE B β ΔR2 
Step 1: Demographic variables     .04* 
Age 0.03 0.19 .01  
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 8.91 3.43 .21*  
Step 2: HEXACO except for Honesty/Humility     .02 
Age 0.02 0.19 .01  
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 10.39 3.72 .24*  
Emotionality -2.34 2.83 -.07  
Extraversion -2.08 2.42 -.07  
Agreeableness 1.51 2.93 .04  
Conscientiousness -2.75 2.85 -.08  
Openness -1.06 2.46 -.04  
Step 3: HEXACO Honesty/Humility    .05* 
Age -0.09 0.19 -.04  
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 8.53 3.67 .20*  
Emotionality -2.07 2.76 -.07  
Extraversion -3.56 2.41 -.13  
Agreeableness -1.14 2.99 -.03  
Conscientiousness -3.64 2.80 -.10  
Openness -0.55 2.40 -.02  
Honesty/Humility 7.50 2.50 .27*  
Step 4: Character strengths dimensions    .04* 
Age -0.04 0.19 -.02  
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female) 6.47 3.75 .15  
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Emotionality -2.70 3.19 -.09  
Extraversion -8.78 3.17 -.31*  
Agreeableness -0.57 3.28 -.02  
Conscientiousness -1.11 2.95 -.03  
Openness -0.19 2.63 -.01  
Honesty/Humility 7.65 2.53 .27*  
Strengths of the mind (-) vs. heart (+) 5.04 2.01 .28*  
Strengths relating to the self (-) vs. others (+) 0.00 2.09 .00  
Note. N = 155. Total R2 = .15. Total adjusted R2 = .09. Method: enter.  
* p < .05 (two-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
